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Degradation as a 
Cause of Burma’s 
Rohingya Crisis 
HELENA S. LONG 
 
Abstract 
Over the course of the past decade, 
persecution against the Rohingya ethnic 
group in Western Burma has escalated to the 
point of genocide. Since August 2017 alone, 
more than 730,000 Rohingya have fled their 
homes in Rakhine State to neighboring 
Bangladesh1. Previous studies on the causes 
of this crisis have focused on the colonial 
legacy of discrimination toward ethnic and 
religious minorities in Burma, themes of 
identity and citizenship, and role of social 
media in fueling the violence. Over, this 
paper will consider what may be an 
overlooked factor: the role of environmental 
stress in inciting the conflict. After outlining 
commonly understood causes of the crisis, 
this paper seeks to evaluate the extent to 
which environmental stress factored in by 
(1) examining the status of environmental 
degradation and natural disasters in Burma, 
(2) considering how environmental pressure 
may exacerbate violence against the 
Rohingya, and (3) comparing this crisis to 
ethnic conflict in Sudan, where 
environmental stress was undoubtedly a 
cause of violence. By establishing where 
and how environmental stress played into 
the Rohingya crisis, recommendations to 
reduce the likelihood of environmental 





Over the course of the past decade, 
persecution against the Rohingya ethnic 
group in Western Burma has escalated to the 
point of genocide, with the United Nations 
Human Rights Council finding genocidal 
intent in a 2019 factfinding mission2 and a 
trial in the International Court of Justice 
ongoing.3 Since August 2017 alone, more 
than 730,000 Rohingya have fled their 
homes in Rakhine State to neighboring 
Bangladesh4. Previous analysis on the 
causes of this crisis have focused on the 
colonial legacy of discrimination toward 
ethnic and religious minorities in Burma,5 
themes of identity and citizenship,6 
consequences of the 2011 democratic 
opening including the emergence of 
Buddhist extremist groups,7 and the 
contribution of social media in escalating 
violence.8 However, this paper considers 
what may be an overlooked factor: the 
impact of environmental stress. After 
outlining historical context and the 
commonly understood causes of the crisis, 
this paper evaluates the extent to which 
environmental stress played a causal role by 
(1) examining the status of environmental 
degradation and natural disasters in 
Burma, (2) considering the relationship 
between the environment and violence, and 
(3) comparing this crisis to ethnic conflict in 
Sudan, a frequently cited eco-conflict. After 
establishing where and how environmental 
stress is related to the Rohingya crisis, 
policy recommendations for lessening this 
factor’s role in Burma—as well as in other 
conflict regions— are offered and assessed.  
 
Background and Historical Context  
Burma, also known as Myanmar, is a 
country of approximately 55,600,000 people 
located in Southeast Asia (see Figure 1for 
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map) with an extremely ethnically diverse 
population; the most populous ethnic groups 
are Burman (68%), Shan (9%), Karen (7%), 
Rakhine (4%), Chinese (3%), Indian (2%), 
and Mon (2%).9 For most of the region’s 
history, various ethnic groups maintained 
independent city-states and kingdoms, but in 
the 19th century, Britain conquered Burma 
and incorporated it as a province of the 
Indian Empire.10 In 1937, Britain began 
administering Burma as a separate, self-




Figure 1: Map of Burma administrative 
districts12  
 
From independence until recently, 
Burma has been governed by a series of 
right-wing military and one-party regimes. 13 
In 1989, following a year of violent unrest, a 
new ruling junta changed the country’s 
name from Burma to Myanmar, although 
many countries including the United States 
still do not recognize the name change due 
to the illegitimacy of the government that 
made the decision.14 In the 1990 election, 
the National League for Democracy, a pro-
democracy party led by Aung San Suu Kyi, 
won a landslide victory, but the junta 
refused to hand over power and Suu Kyi was 
placed under house arrest.15 In 1991, Suu 
Kyi gained international recognition when 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize while still 
under house arrest; in total, she would spend 
15 of the next 21 years under house arrest 
and was most recently detained in February 
2021 during the country’s latest coup.16  
 Following the 1990 elections, 
General Than Shwe became the paramount 
ruler of the country for almost two decades 
until the 2011 general elections, when the 
military junta was officially dissolved.17 In 
the wake of this democratic opening, 
President Barack Obama became the first 
U.S. president to visit Burma in 2012, 
meeting with Suu Kyi, who had been 
released from house arrest and elected to the 
national legislature.18 President Obama 
commended her as a champion of 
democracy and human rights, thus launching 
Burma’s progress into the international 
spotlight.19 In 2015, the first credible 
election in decades was held, with the NLD 
emerging with an overwhelming victory and 
Suu Kyi becoming the de facto head of 
state.20  
Reforms over the past decade were 
marred by the continuing control of the 
military (also known as the Tatmadaw) in 
daily and political life and proven to be 
short-lived in the aftermath of the latest 
coup.21 The current Commander in Chief, 
Min Aung Hlaing, was recommended for 
investigation into crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and genocide by the UNHRC in 
201922 and assumed all state power after 
leading the Tatmadaw in arresting Suu Kyi 
and other senior NLD leaders in February 
2021.23 
The 2019 investigation into Aung 
Hlaing primarily regarded the intense 
violence against the Rohingya people on the 
western edge of Burma.24 The government 
of Burma recognizes 135 “national races” in 
Burma based on a list compiled in 1962.25 
The Rohingya—all 2.5 million of them—are 
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not one of these, constituting the world’s 
largest stateless population, meaning they 
are not citizens of any country.26 In fact, 
most Burmese (including Suu Kyi) do not 
even use the word “Rohingya,” rather, they 
consider the group to be illegal immigrants 
from Bangladesh.27 The exact origins of the 
Rohingya are not known, but there is 
evidence that this group has been present in 
the region since the 13th century.28 The 
Rohingya are not the only Muslims in 
Burma—about 4% of the population is 
Muslim, compared to more than two-thirds 
who are Buddhist.29 However, Rohingya are 
distinct from other Muslims in the country, 
living in rural areas of the country’s Rakhine 
State, speaking a dialect of Bengali, and 
having Muslim rather than Burmese 
names.30  
 There have long been divisions 
between the Rohingya and other ethnic 
groups in Burma. During WWII, the 
Rohingya, along with the Karen and Kachin 
minority groups, sided with the Allies and 
engaged in guerilla warfare while the 
Burmans sided with the Japanese.31 
Following independence in 1948, the 
Rohingya were gradually excluded from 
state institutions. In 1974, the Rohingya 
were labelled foreign citizens and mandated 
to carry registration cards to distinguish 
them from Burmans.32 The 1982 Citizenship 
Law then effectively rendered the Rohingya 
stateless by requiring all citizens to either 
(1) be a member of the 135 national races, 
(2) have a pending application under the 
1948 Union Citizenship Act, or (3) have 
conclusive evidence of residence in Burma 
before independence.33 The political 
upheaval around 1990 further worsened 
conditions for the Rohingya: a campaign 
against Muslims was seen as strengthening 
the military government’s national 
credentials among Buddhists.34 Nearly 
300,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh in the 
early 1990s, claiming the military forced 
them from their homes,35 and the Tatmadaw 
restricted the population’s movement within 
Rakhine state.36 In 1995, the UNHCR 
pressured Burma into providing “Temporary 
Registration Cards” to the Rohingya, but 
violence continued past the turn of the 
century with attacks on Muslim schools and 
places of worship.37 In 2005, a two-child 
policy was introduced in Rakhine State, 
solely for the Rohingya population.38   
 Violence worsened after the 
democratic opening of 2011.39 In June 2012, 
the alleged rape and murder of a Rakhine 
woman by three Muslim youths incited a 
killing spree.40 The Rakhine are the largest 
ethnic group in Rakhine state, and are 
predominately Buddhist; in 2009, insurgents 
formed the Arakan Army seeking self-
determination for the Rakhine people, 
adding another complicated dimension to 
the conflict as the army clashes with both 
the Tatmadaw and Rohingya.41 The violence 
in 2012 between Rakhine and Rohingya 
communities left at least 100 people dead 
and left thousands of buildings including 
homes, mosques, monasteries, and schools 
burned down.42  
2015 is generally considered the start 
of the Rohingya refugee crisis, as increasing 
“ghettoization, sporadic massacres, and 
restrictions on movement” of the Rohingya 
caused thousands to flee on rickety boats to 
other Southeast Asian countries.43 In 2017, 
the Tatmadaw began a “clearance 
operation,” which included “extra judicial 
killings, gang rapes, arson—all argued to 
constitute genocide, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.”44 Some 700,000 
Rohingya fled Burma to refugee camps in 
Bangladesh, leaving just about 200,000 
Rohingya in Rakhine State by October 
2018.45 In 2019, Burmese authorities 
claimed the Rohingya could return, and 
began operating “reception centers” near the 
border, but these centers are often empty due 
to the displaced people’s deep distrust that 
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they will return to safe conditions.46 
Findings from the 2019 UNHRC factfinding 
mission found that although “clearance 
operations” on the scale of 2017 ceased, “the 
Rohingya remain the target of a Government 
attack aimed at erasing the identity and 
removing them from Myanmar...With 
another year having passed without 
improvements to their dire living conditions, 
prospects for accountability or legal 
recognition as citizens of Myanmar, their 
plight can only be considered as having 
deteriorated.”47  
 
Established Causes of the Conflict  
Most existing scholarship on the causes of 
the Rohingya crisis focuses on the long 
history of ethnic conflict and discrimination 
in Burma. Jobair Alam argues that this 
discrimination is rooted in the British 
colonial era, stating that before the arrival of 
the British, “the different groups that make 
up the complex ethnic tapestry of Burma 
were never under the authority of a single 
government.”48 The British era created the 
majority-minority divide and deep 
nationalism tied to Buddhist identity that 
exists to this day.49 After independence, 
discrimination was solidified into laws such 
as the 1982 Citizenship Law which rendered 
the Rohingya stateless and deprived them of 
access to education, health services, and 
employment.50 This stripping of citizenship 
“largely (re)shaped the identity of the 
Rohingya in Myanmar as a non-Burman 
Muslim religious minority,” compared to 
minorities who “strictly comply with and fit 
absolutely in the Burmese-constructed 
ideals, belief and identity.”51 Even 
disregarding acts of violence against the 
Rohingya, their rejection from the state has 
led to restrictions on travel, marriage, 
birthing rates, and freedom of religion.52 The 
Rohingya are not the only minority group to 
face discrimination in Burma; the UN has 
investigated the Tatmadaw for violence 
against groups including the Shan, Kachin, 
Karen, and Chin53 (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Image by Author In 2018, I briefly visited the 
city of Tachileik in Burma’s Shan State while studying abroad in 
Thailand. The Shan battle for independence is another example of 
ethnic conflict in Burma. 
 
However, while there are multiple 
ethnic conflicts ongoing in Burma, the 
campaign against the Rohingya has been the 
most systematic.54 A 1988 regime document 
recently uncovered by the International State 
Crime Institute exposed a long term plan for 
eradication of the Rohingya, with steps 
including forbidding land ownership and 
finding the Rohingya at fault in all court 
cases—but avoiding mass killing “in order 
not to invite the attention of the Muslim 
countries.”55 This document embodies one 
of the main established causes of the current 
crisis: discrimination against the Rohingya 
is deeply rooted in laws and practices under 
the military regime, and the Tatmadaw has 
simply been waiting for an excuse “to totally 
wipe them out from Rakhine.”56 The extent 
to which the ethnic conflict is civilian as 
well as military based is debated; for 
example, there is deep animosity between 
Rakhine and Rohingya locals, but at least 
part of this resentment may be attributed to 
manipulation by the Tatmadaw in turning 
the groups against each other.57 
 Beyond ethnic discrimination, 
religious discrimination is pertinent to this 
crisis. Islamophobia is common among 
many Burmese Buddhists, and Rakhine 
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state’s location bordering Muslim 
Bangladesh makes some consider it the 
“‘western gate’... the last line of defence 
protecting the pure, Theravadda Buddhism” 
of Burma from Islam.58 Some Buddhists 
hold the view that, “If the gate breaks, the 
tens of millions of Muslims from Bengal 
will overrun not only Myanmar but also 
mainland Southeast Asia, much as is 
narrated to have occurred centuries ago in 
island Southeast Asia.”59  
 Nobody disputes that a long history 
of ethnic and religious discrimination 
against the Rohingya underlies the latest 
violent campaign against them. What is less 
certain however, is the specific events that 
triggered the unprecedented bloodshed of 
the past decade. Waves of violence have hit 
Rakhine State before, but recent years are 
distinct in their display of “undeterred 
propagation of hate speech coupled with 
clear political coordination.”60 One theory is 
that the democratic reopening triggered the 
violence. The most recent Constitution, 
written in 2008, “is notable for the degree to 
which it has not only conjoined the state and 
national races lexically but also 
institutionally.”61 The Constitution 
emphasized the idea of “taingyintha,” or 
“national races” of Burma, and suggested 
that belonging to one of the recognized races 
was of even greater importance than 
citizenship.62 The Constitution frames 
taingyintha as creating a “mythic unity that 
has never emerged and could be read as a 
defiant repudiation of ethnic diversity.”63  
 In addition to constitutional changes, 
when the military junta lifted limits on free 
expression and assembly in 2011, it allowed 
for a wave of populist mobilization where 
“deep, pent-up societal division and hatred, 
which was repressed by authoritarian rule” 
was unleashed by the democratization 
process.64 Two Buddhist extremist groups 
emerged in the aftermath of the 2011 
transition: the “969 Movement” and “Ma-
Ba-Tha,” both of which have been tolerated 
and even promoted by the government.65 
Many westerners consider Buddhism a 
pacifist religion; however, certain monks are 
at the forefront of the violence. For example, 
U Wirathu, the monk leader of the 969 
movement, was called the “Face of Buddhist 
Terror” by Time magazine in 2013.66 These 
extremist groups successfully campaigned 
the government to revoke the Rohingya’s 
temporary registration certificates in 2015 
and have spewed hate speech, including 
calling Islam “a faith of animals with 
uncontrollable birthrates."67 Additionally, 
fearmongering and discrimination have 
become campaign tools in the era of 
democracy, and both “hardliners and so-
called reformists find incentives in being 
complicit in the anti-Muslim conflicts.”68 
Thus, while democratic developments in 
Burma over the past decade promised 
reform from the years of junta control, they 
may in fact have helped incite the conflict in 
Rakhine State by releasing “hard-core and 
deeply felt grievances about Buddhism 
being under siege from the forces of 
modernity, globalism and Islam.”69  
 A final factor commonly cited as 
amplifying the violence is the use of social 
media in Burma. In Burma, Facebook is so 
widely used by the country’s 18 million 
internet users that it is often equated with the 
internet itself.70 In 2018, a New York Times 
investigation revealed that not only were 
extremist groups using Facebook to disperse 
hate speech, but the military itself was 
behind turning “the social network into a 
tool for ethnic cleansing.”71 Military 
personnel created fake accounts and flooded 
them with hate speech, including posting 
pictures of corpses they said were evidence 
of massacres by the Rohingya, and stated 
that Muslim attacks were imminent.72 
Facebook took down accounts after the 
investigation revealed ties to the military but 
received criticism for its response and 
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commitment to preventing similar situations 
in the future.73 The internet provides a 
means of propaganda beyond anything in the 
past, and the systematic use of it by 
extremists and the military to instigate 
violence contributed to the crisis’ outbreak 
and intensity.  
 
Environmental Factors in Burma  
With an understanding of the prevailing 
causal theories, environmental factors in 
Burma can be discussed. The environment 
has long been studied as a “threat 
multiplier” for existing conflicts.74 Thomas 
F. Homer-Dixon writes that environmental 
scarcity “can contribute to civil violence, 
including insurgencies and ethnic clashes.”75 
However, its role is rarely direct, rather 
interacting with other factors to produce 
violence, and therefore analysts often 
overlook scarcity’s role in flaring underlying 
stress and instead interpret economic, social, 
or political factors as the principal cause.76 
An example of interaction between social 
and environmental factors is “resource 
capture,” when dominant groups within a 
society “shift resource distribution in their 
favor.” 77 Moreover, environmental scarcity 
may strengthen group identities based on 
ethnic, class, or religious affiliations in a 
process known as social segmentation, as 
groups face intensified competitive for 
resources.78 
While the role of resource scarcity in 
conflict is far from new, climate change, 
population growth, and economic 
development are expected to increase the 
prevalence of these circumstances.79 
Through catastrophic weather events, 
climate change, “will lead to new or more 
intense resource scarcities, which, in turn, 
will trigger more intense competition and 
conflict between states and local 
communities sharing common resources.”80  
 This existing framework for the role 
of environmental scarcity and natural 
disasters in fueling conflict evokes the 
situation in Burma, which faces an 
increasingly vulnerable environmental state. 
A 2019 World Bank report concluded that 
Burma’s ecosystems, fisheries, and forestry 
are under “tremendous pressure.”81 Burma’s 
marine fish resources have declined as much 
as 90 percent since 1980, forest cover has 
declined by 10 million hectares since 1990, 
and urban waste, mining discharge, and air 
quality are all deteriorating as well.82  
As Burma relies heavily on natural 
resource exploitation for economic 
development, environmental degradation 
affects not only the natural world and human 
health, but economic prosperity. Seventy 
percent of the labor force is employed in 
agriculture, accounting for 37.8 percent of 
GDP.83 The government has prioritized 
short-term profit over long-term 
sustainability, with slash-and-burn and 
industrial agriculture methods promoted.84 
Burma’s policies hostile to sustainable 
changes “can force the cultivation systems 
into suboptimal practices … or obstruct 
them altogether, leading to poverty and 
conflict, alienating cultivators and leading to 
degraded land.” 85 Climate change will 
compound this threat, with the FAO finding 
that Burma is “highly vulnerable to climate 
change and extreme weather conditions,” 
with significant risk for agricultural 
production and food insecurity. 86 The FAO 
and World Bank call for sustainable policy 
approaches to prevent a worse-case scenario. 
 Unfortunately, a different kind of 
worse-case scenario is already facing 
Rakhine State. Rakhine State is one of the 
most resource-rich parts of the country, 
despite being one of the poorest 
economically.87 However, recent efforts aim 
to tap into the region’s potential. For 
example, between 2000 and 2014, Rakhine 
state lost more mangrove forest cover than 
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any other state in Burma, causing an 
estimated ecosystem value loss of $946.87 
million per year due to damages to fisheries 
and habitat.88 When resource-rich Rakhine 
state is contrasted to conditions in Burma’s 
central states, where the populous regions of 
Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing display 
existing land degradation due to problems 
with erosion, desertification, salinization, 
and deforestation,89 the question is raised: 
does the recent exploitation of Rakhine 
state’s resources constitute a “resource 
capture” scenario as conditions deteriorate 
in primarily Burman states?  
Burma’s “Agenda 21” plan for 
sustainable development, a document 
submitted to the U.N., even hints at this 
intention. In it, programs for “the 
development of border areas and national 
races” and reclaiming “cultivable 
wastelands” are described.90 This reference 
to taingyintha is alarming within a 
sustainable development plan, and the plan 
may be coming to fruition. In the midst of 
the Rohingya crisis, the government 
announced that Rakhine state would be 
transformed into a business hub, and 
countries including Japan and Korea have 
already invested in the state.91 A.K.M Ahsan 
Ullah and Diotima Chattoraj claim that to 
implement this development plan, “the 
government needed to wipe out Rohingya 
from their homeland.”  
New York Times reporters in Rakhine 
state in 2019 witnessed this development in 
action.92 The reporters noted “infrastructure 
development in Rakhine: new power 
stations, government buildings and, most of 
all, military and border guard bases ... built 
on land emptied by ethnic cleansing,” and 
found that Buddhists had taken over 
Rohingya businesses, that the military 
continues to raze Muslim villages, and that 
the companies responsible for the building 
boom were “cronies of the military.” 93  
Rakhine state is not the only ethnic 
minority state in Burma where resources 
have been seized by the Tatmadaw. For 
example, in Kachin state, “resource 
extraction has provided incentive and 
financing” for the Tatmadaw and the Kachin 
Independence Organization (KIO) to keep 
fighting in a state rich with precious stones 
and minerals.94 In Karen state, the 
Tatmadaw has used “intimidation and 
coercion to seize land and displace local 
people” in an area that is appealing for 
tourism, extractive, and agriculture 
industries.95 
If the Tatmadaw are similarly 
pursuing resource gains in Rakhine state, 
who stands to benefit? While the 
government was known to enlist “Rakhine 
Buddhist fundamentalists to safeguard their 
interests in the resource-rich state,”96 the 
Tatmadaw’s own ongoing conflict with the 
Arakan Army calls to attention that in other 
ethnic regions facing conflict in Burma, 
“armed groups have often been manipulated 
against each other, weakening their military 
capabilities, and often causing them to lose 
control of their natural resources.”97 This 
raises the possibility that both ethnic 
minorities, Rohingya and Rakhine, could be 
excluded from any Tatmadaw development 
plan in favor of enriching the military’s own 
pockets or benefitting solely the Burman 
majority. 
In addition to this development plan, 
specific environmental events may have 
fueled the crisis; in particular, the aftermath 
of Cyclone Nargis had secondary effects on 
the Rakhine region. On May 2, 2008, 
Cyclone Nargis struck Burma’s Irrawaddy 
Delta, located primarily in Ayeyarwady 
Region bordering Rakhine State.98 
Approximately 140,000 people were killed, 
making it the worst natural disaster in 
Burmese history.99 The cyclone additionally 
destroyed much of Burma’s rice crop, as the 
Irrawaddy Delta was one of the primary 
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regions of production, and saline water from 
storm surge contaminated about one million 
acres of cropland.100 This caused severe 
food shortages and high prices, with one 
analyst predicting that due to “the historical 
connection between rice shortages and 
popular unrest … the cycle of explosive 
protest and regime crackdowns is likely to 
continue.”101 While Cyclone Nargis is the 
most severe example, other natural disasters 
such as 2010’s Cyclone Giri and 2017’s 
Cyclone Mora also worsened conditions. 
Cyclone Giri destroyed an estimated 97, 125 
hectares of farmland in Rakhine State,102 
and Cyclone Mora—which hit the region 
after the refugee crisis began—tore through 
refugee camps. These natural disasters likely 
had a destabilizing effect on the region and 
intensified competition for resources.  
The evidence in Burma of 
environmental scarcity, resource capture in 
ethnic regions, and devastating natural 
disasters aligns with the existing framework 
for how environmental stress may fuel 
violence, particularly as a threat multiplier 
on top of deep-rooted social and political 
elements. To further explore this claim, this 
crisis can be compared to another where 
environmental factors are frequently cited as 
playing a role: Sudan.  
 
Comparative Case Study: Sudan  
While the decades-long conflict in Sudan 
(and now South Sudan) began as an ethno-
religious civil war between the 
predominantly Arab Muslim north and the 
African Christian south, the war has grown 
in layers of complexity over the years, and 
now environmental factors including 
drought and desertification are commonly 
recognized as exacerbating the violence.103 
Sudan gained independence from Britain in 
1956, and like many other postcolonial 
states, Sudan was left with few routes to 
economic development beyond its natural 
resources.104 An overconcentration of people 
in central Sudan led to severe degradation 
and overexploitation of the region, 
contributing “to intensifying ethnic 
hostilities and competition for limited 
resources.”105 Additionally, this motivated 
the northern-based government to drive 
southward to extract natural resources, 
jeopardizing the livelihoods of southern 
citizens and contributing to the formation of 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in 
present-day South Sudan.106 While violence 
in Sudan is still best characterized as an 
ethno-religious conflict, “eco-conflicts have 
clearly protracted the Sudanese war” as 
advantaged groups monopolize resources at 
the expense of the majority, resulting “in 
environmental destruction, economic 
decline, social disintegration, population 
displacement, and protracted conflict.107  
 How well does Sudan’s situation 
align with Burma’s? In both cases (see 
Figure 3 for a comparative flowchart) a 
former British colony with extreme ethnic 
and religious diversity was left with few 
tools for survival beyond natural resource 
use. For both countries, this led to 
overexploitation of resources in the 
central/majority-group-controlled regions, 
causing a drive for development in minority 
regions. Finally, in Sudan and Burma, these 
drives for development were followed by 
waves of intense violence within a longer 
history of conflict. However, there are some 
differences. For one, environmental pressure 
in Sudan is more severe, with a 2007 U.N. 
Environmental Programme report declaring 
that the scale of climate change was “almost 
unprecedented: the reduction in rainfall has 
turned millions of hectares of already 
marginal semi-desert grazing land into 
desert.”108 In comparison, Burma is in “a 
region less vulnerable to desertification,” 
although aforementioned issues including 
soil erosion, salinization, soil fertility 
depletion, and alkalinization affect about 17 
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percent of the country, primarily in the 
central regions.109 Another difference 
between Sudan and Burma is the presence of 
climate migration. In Sudan, drought, 
desertification, and flooding are direct 
causes of migration and internal 
displacement, as these issues force people to 
seek more arable land.110 In Burma, there is 
little evidence that environmental factors 
directly cause IDPs and climate refugees, 
but environmental pressure may intensify 
the conflicts that produce refugees. Finally, 
the role of natural disasters is different in 
these two countries: Burma is vulnerable to 
unpredictable, one-time events such as 
cyclones, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic 
eruptions, and landslides, whereas Sudan is 
more vulnerable to long-term events such as 
droughts. 
 
Figure 3: Infographic by Author 
 
 The case of Sudan helps exemplify 
how the Rohingya crisis fits the framework 
of a conflict with environmental layers, even 
if degradation in Burma is less severe than 
Sudan. While there is limited prior research 
on the role of environmental pressure in 
Burmese conflicts, there are clear 
similarities between Burma and Sudan 
where more scholarship on eco-conflict 
exists, thus displaying how a combination of 
ethnic tensions, unequal distribution of 
power, and resource scarcity fuels violence.  
 
Environmental Impacts of the Crisis 
Not only have environmental problems in 
Burma seemingly contributed to the past 
decade’s flare-up of violence against the 
Rohingya, but the crisis itself has impacted 
the environment. As of August 2019, more 
than 730,000 Rohingya refugees are living 
in the world’s largest refugee encampment 
in Bangladesh, a “teeming, squalid 
settlement” where landslides, rampaging 
elephants, and disease are common.111  
These camps put tremendous pressure on 
local ecosystems. About 4,300 acres of hills 
and forests were cut down to make shelters 
and to use as cooking fuel, and every month 
an additional nearly 6,800 tons of firewood 
are collected.112 This deforestation causes 
biodiversity loss and increases the risk of 
landslides.113 Additionally, air quality is 
declining as a result of increased vehicular 
traffic and smoke from cooking fires, and 
there are no long-term solutions for waste 
management including fecal matter and 
plastics.114 This has resulted in the 
contamination of already-limited water 
resources, with about 70 percent of 
groundwater samples in a 2017 study found 
to be heavily polluted.115 The poor 
environmental outlook for areas around the 
camps not only negatively impacts 
ecosystems and creates even worse 
conditions for the already suffering 
Rohingya, but risks additional conflict. A 
summary of physical impacts of the camps 
in a U.N. Development Programme report 
concluded that, “In particular the impacts on 
groundwater may give rise to significant 
social conflicts between the host 
communities and Rohingya over the use of 
water resources.”116  
 
Analysis of Causes 
Few, if any, conflicts are one-dimensional. 
Conflicts consist of “numerous root causes 
interacting or stimulating each other and 
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finally escalating into the explosion … 
conflict is a process, not a fixed state of 
crisis.”117 In the case of Burma, the root 
causes of the Rohingya crisis are ethnic 
discrimination stemming from the British 
colonial era and religious discrimination 
intensified by the civilization “fault line” 
between Burma and Bangladesh. These root 
causes have resulted in systematic exclusion 
of the Rohingya from Burmese society, with 
a system of laws and policies denying them 
citizenship and basic rights. With this long 
history of exclusion, what factors incited the 
recent phase of violence, which peaked in 
2017? While prior scholarship primarily 
cites societal changes caused by the 2011 
democratic opening, the emergence of new 
Buddhist extremist groups, and propaganda 
efforts made possible by social media, 
increasing environmental pressure in Burma 
should be considered a factor as well.  
 In Burma, overreliance on natural 
resources, unsustainable government 
policies, and natural disasters including the 
devastating Cyclone Nargis have contributed 
to a situation of environmental stress, with 
the country’s ecosystems, fisheries, and 
forestry coming under tremendous 
pressure.118 One sign of this stress is land 
degradation in the populous central regions, 
and there is evidence that the Tatmadaw’s 
solution to securing resources (whether to 
fund its own operations or for the majority 
ethnic and religious groups) is to exploit 
resource-rich ethnic minority states. For 
instance, Burma’s Agenda 21 plan lists 
development of border areas and national 
races as a sustainable development 
program,119 and resource capture is evident 
within conflicts in both Karen120 and Kachin 
States.121 That a similar seizure—rather than 
pure ethnic conflict—is unfolding in 
Rakhine state is evidenced by a recent 
harvesting push in the region for resources 
such as mangroves and an announcement by 
the government after the “clearance 
operations” of 2017 that Rakhine State 
would be transformed into a business hub.122 
This infrastructure development on land 
cleared by ethnic cleansing, with Buddhists 
moving in where the Rohingya were killed 
or forced out, has been witnessed by 
reporters in the region.123  
 Therefore, while violence against the 
Rohingya is mired in deep ethnic and 
religious division, codified in discriminatory 
policies, and has been foreshadowed for 
decades—most explicitly by a regime 
document with a long-term eradication plan 
for the Rohingya—environmental scarcity in 
Burma fits the framework for eco-conflicts 
as an “aggravating cause in a highly 
complex, multicausal system.”124 The 
environmental layer likely not only interacts 
with the long-term causes of the crisis, but 
also with other inciting factors. For example, 
Homer-Dixon’s social segmentation process 
of heightened group identity in the face of 
resource competition may partially explain 
the emergence of players within the conflict 
such as Buddhist extremist groups or the 
Arakan army. Additionally, in the wake of 
the democratic opening, the Tatmadaw may 
have sought ways to strengthen itself after 
losing junta control, with lucrative foreign 
contracts for infrastructure development in 
ethnic regions a possible solution. And 
further, the Rohingya crisis’ own 
environmental impacts including degraded 
land, water, and air in areas around the 
refugee camps risk a circular effect of 
starting new conflict with the host 
community. These are examples of the ways 
in which environmental factors may weave 
throughout a conflict to inspire new points 
of tension or exacerbate existing ones. 
While “because the relationship between 
environmental scarcity and contextual 
factors is interactive, it is often impossible to 
determine the relative weight or power of 
environmental scarcity as a cause of 
violence in specific cases,” the evidence in 
10




Burma leads to the conclusion that 
environmental factors must be considered 




The Rohingya crisis is often called a 
hopeless one. While in April 2018, Burma 
agreed to begin “voluntary and dignified 
repatriations,” almost no Rohingya have 
returned.125 The Rohingya are terrified to 
return to the site of mass killings, and 
Burmese officials still fail to even recognize 
them as a distinct ethnic group, much less 
citizens.126 The September 2019 UNHRC 
factfinding mission on Burma found that 
there is a serious risk of genocidal actions 
recurring, and that it is impossible for the 
Rohingya to return in current conditions.127 
Meanwhile, the Bangladeshi government, 
struggling with overpopulation and poverty, 
is under pressure from its citizens to ensure 
that funds are not diverted to refugees, who 
have not been given official refugee status to 
ensure their placement is not permanent.128  
 General recommendations for 
addressing this conflict include repealing the 
1982 Citizenship Law and offering an 
accessible path to citizenship for the 
Rohingya.129 Additionally, Burma should 
close its internal camps housing Rohingya 
and provide them with adequate land and 
freedom of movement.130 The UNHRC does 
not recommend returning refugees located in 
Bangladesh to Burma until adequate 
provisions for their protection exist.131 
International acts such as prosecuting Burma 
for crimes against humanity, severing 
relations between the international 
community and the Tatmadaw, and 
instituting sanctions to prevent the flow of 
arms and other military equipment into the 
country may pressure the government into 
action. The UN factfinding mission on 
Myanmar listed 14 known international 
suppliers of arms to Burma, which included 
companies based in China, Russia, India, 
and Singapore (see figure 4 for a chart of 
suppliers132). However, the practical 
limitations of these recommendations must 
be acknowledged, particularly in light of the 
February 2021 coup when the Tatmadaw 
regained control of the government. Despite 
being alienated from much of the global 
community and with genocide proceedings 
ongoing in the International Court of Justice, 
the Tatmadaw has only doubled down on 
suppression—not just for ethnic minorities, 
but all opposition.133 In a country where 
officials still claim “‘Rohingya’ is not 
real,”134 a better future within Burma’s 




Figure 4: Infographic on arms and military 
equipment suppliers to Burma 
 
 Recommendations specific to 
environmental causes begin with addressing 
the underlying degradation. As Homer-
Dixon writes, “if severe environmental 
damage becomes irreversible, it can become 
a permanent source of social stress; even if 
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the political and economic factors that 
originally produced the damage are 
fixed.”135 Between continued 
overexploitation of resources, population 
growth, and the accelerating threat of 
climate change, Burma must take action 
now to prevent permanent harm to the land 
and resources its people depend upon for 
survival. Actions such as restoring 
productivity to land through sustainable 
agriculture methods, diversifying crops, 
combating illegal logging and poaching, and 
improving urban conditions through waste 
management and air pollution projects can 
help improve Burma’s environmental status. 
Additionally, Burma should move away 
from a largely natural resource-based 
economy as outlined in the country’s 
Sustainable Development Plan. However, 
development projects must benefit all 
residents; specifically in Rakhine state, 
development programs “should take the 
necessary steps to ensure that their actions, 
first, do not enrich the Tatmadaw and, 
second, are of benefit to all the ethnic 
communities of Rakhine State on the basis 
of equality.”136 By addressing underlying 
environmental degradation, curbing climate 
change, and developing sustainably and 
inclusively, environmental issues could 
move far down the long list of factors 
causing conflict in Burma. Additionally, to 
prevent the degradation caused by refugee 
camps from perhaps fueling more violence, 
international aid should be directed to 
refugees to supply resources such as 
alternative fuel options and safe drinking 
water. Whether in a Bangladeshi camp or in 
the central regions of Burma, unmitigated 
deterioration of environmental conditions 
can only be expected to increase tensions in 
the region, possibly leading to further social 
segmentation, resource capture, and 
violence.     
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, environmental degradation in 
Burma has been examined as a factor in the 
ongoing Rohingya crisis. While the root 
causes of this conflict are long-term and 
systematic ethnic and religious 
discrimination, Burma’s declining 
environmental status should be considered 
alongside the fallout of the 2011 democratic 
opening, a wave of Buddhist extremism, and 
propaganda spread through social media as 
an inciting factor. Limited prior research 
exists on the Rohingya crisis as an eco-
conflict; however, through examining the 
location and extent of degradation and 
natural disasters in Burma, the government’s 
stated plans for development, and the 
current situation in Rakhine State, a portrait 
of the environmental layers of the crisis can 
be painted. Additionally, the situation in 
Burma can be placed within the existing 
framework for the role of environmental 
scarcity in ethno-religious conflicts, with the 
Tatmadaw’s actions in ethnic regions of 
Burma aligning with the concept of resource 
capture and showing how competition may 
contribute to social segmentation. Finally, a 
comparative case-study to conflict in Sudan 
sheds light on how while “environmental 
stress results in violent conflict only when 
interacting with other political, ethnic, 
economic, and social causes,”137 (Lee, 
1997), in both Burma and Sudan, resource 
scarcity and inequality led to worsening 
violence along existing fault lines. With few 
signs that Burma will soon turn to more 
sustainable resource use, and with climate 
change certain to aggravate natural disasters 
and land quality issues, action needs to be 
taken now to prevent the intensification of 
conflict in an already conflict-ridden 
country. The situation of the Rohingya in 
Burma provides further warning for other 
countries facing upheaval in how 
environmental stress may lace itself through 
12




fracture points—a warning that must be 
heeded as environmental threats accelerate 
and intensify worldwide.  
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